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Introduction
We live in a global era. Money and communications traverse the planet at the stroke
of a button. Travelers reach remote corners of the world in fractions of the time and
effort of mere decades ago. Consumers have goods from nearly anywhere delivered
to their doorstops. Businesses search for markets and labor across borders, while
migrants bring once distant cultures into close proximity. Nonetheless, whereas
society across the world may be more connected than ever before, our
understanding of the state in such an era is fraught with contention. Scholars debate
the extent to which globalization changes relationships between states,
intergovernmental organizations, and global civil society. Some observers argue
that states may be growing closer in contact, but the state itself is adapting and
developing new ways of exerting power. Others argue that the consequences of
globalization necessitate forms of governance and coordination beyond the
capacity of the state. This article presents evidence of the latter.
In this article, I highlight how technological innovation influences
relationships among states. The consequences of globalization and technological
innovation go hand in hand. If globalization increases the proximity of states to one
another, technological innovation—specifically digitization—changes the flow of
information among states and between the state and society. Precisely, then, what
are the implications of globalization and digitization for the state? I argue that
globalization and digitization force the state to rely on international organization.
The emergence of cryptocurrency exemplifies this dynamic. Cryptocurrencies are
digital payment systems that use cryptography to operate securely without a thirdparty intermediary. The first cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, was released in 2009 and has
inspired the development of thousands of others. As of December 2018, there were
at least 35 million cryptocurrency users worldwide.1
By altering financial channels and obscuring information flows,
cryptocurrency disrupts conventional taxation mechanisms, compelling states to
turn to international regimes for support. Specifically, individuals and nonstate
actors may use foreign cryptocurrency holdings to evade taxation. In response,
states turn to international regimes such as the “Automatic Exchange of
Information” to share information with one another and combat tax evasion.
Otherwise, states must resort to domestic coercion or ideological manipulation to
maintain revenue objectives. To explain why, I develop and test a theory of “copredation,” extending Margaret Levi’s theory of predatory rule to the international
arena. “Co-Predatory Rule” explains when states cooperate to maximize revenues,
as globalization and digitization threaten the effectiveness of traditional taxation
1
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mechanisms. The implication is significant: when technological innovations such
as cryptocurrency subvert the state’s capacity to raise revenue, the state must take
dramatic measures to adapt or risk becoming outmoded in the 21st century.

Literature Review: Globalization and Taxation
Globalization is a contested concept in the literature. Beginning with a definition
of globalization, Mauro Guillen (2001) summarizes major fault lines in debate. If
globalization is “a process leading to greater interdependence and mutual
awareness (reflexivity) among economic, political, and social units in the world,
and among actors in general,” (236) paramount is the question of whether or not
globalization is “really happening.” Those who argue in the affirmative point
largely to “increasing cross-border flows of goods, services, money, people,
information, and culture” (236). Skeptics argue that globalization is overstated and
nothing new. Some observe that international trade, for example, is concentrated in
a handful of countries and remains but a fraction of total national economic activity.
If one grants that globalization is happening, a series of questions unfolds: do state
policies converge? Does globalization undermine states’ authority? Is there a
substantive difference between globality and modernity? Is a global culture
emerging? Assuming that yes, globalization is really happening, my analytical
point of departure is the nexus between globality and modernity, exemplified by
cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrency is a fitting example because it operates both
globally and digitally. As such, it presents an illuminating case through which to
probe these questions.
Virginie Guiradon and Gallya Lahav (2000) explore the effect of
international regimes on state decision making and thus speak directly to the
question of whether globalization threatens national sovereignty. Guiradon and
Lahav examine the case of migration control in Germany, France, and the
Netherlands, evaluating how international legal norms impact state behavior and
how states respond in turn. Specifically, international human rights norms
promoting family unity and condemning inhumane treatment have been at odds
with state deportation policy. Guiradon and Lahav (164) find that states adapt to
such international constraints by “[devolving] decision making in monitoring and
execution upward to intergovernmental fora, downward to elected local authorities,
and outward to private actors.” Although it took decades in each of the three
national cases, significant pressure on states unfolded through “international
cooptation” (171-175). Attempting to constrain national migration control, national
judiciaries—supported by domestic interest groups—referred to international
human rights standards promulgated by the European Court of Human Rights. In
response, states circumvented such pressures by shifting the locus of migration
control. While their finding implies a shift of national sovereignty, Guiradon and
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Lahav (165) offer a more sophisticated interpretation: this form of devolution is
“sharing competence,” ceding some autonomy “to meet national policy goals,
regaining sovereignty in another sense: capabilities to rule.” This analysis considers
the extent to which states behave with respect to cryptocurrency as predicted by
Guiradon’s and Lahav’s findings.
Turning from the literature on globalization to the literature on taxation, I
consider Margaret Levi’s (1988) Of Rule and Revenue. Levi’s theory of “predatory
rule” illuminates a central goal to which states are oriented, as well as a set of
constraints that state elites face in pursuit of that goal. For, as Levi (10) asserts,
“Rulers maximize revenue to the state, but not as they please.” The premise is that
state elites act rationally in pursuit of their goals, which necessitates the objective
to accumulate resources in the form of tax revenue. In short, to spend, states must
raise money. In Levi’s (3) words, “rulers are predatory in that they try to extract as
much revenue as they can from the population.” Based on this imperative, Levi
devises two general forms of relationship between ruler and ruled: the state as a
collective good provider and the state as a “protection racket.” (“Protection racket”
is Levi’s (11) colorful way of describing state tax policy that involves no provision
of goods or services other than withholding the heavy hand of the state in exchange
for compliance.) History is replete with states taking both forms, Levi finds, and
often involves some combination of the two.
The forms a state takes in relation to its subjects, and ultimately its ability
to maximize state revenue, rests on six constraints its rulers face. Levi divides the
constraints into two categories: structural constraints and behavioral constraints.2
Three structural constraints situate rulers in decision-making environments that
shape rulers’ incentives and the information at their disposal. First, “productive
forces and economic structure” reflect the state of a nation’s economy, including
the relations and influence of land, labor, and capital interests. Productive forces
also influence the array of material goods the state is expected to supply its subjects.
Second, “international context” recognizes that states do not operate in a vacuum
but are subject to external pressures and inducements, primarily through
competition with other states. In this respect, elements such as trade, international
investment, and regulatory arbitrage may serve to extend or constrict a state’s total
revenue base. Third, “form of government” dictates the range of choices available
to state leaders. Government form places constraints on state leaders given their
principal-agent roles, the character of political rivalry, and the array of compliance
measures at their disposal.
The second, behavioral, set of constraints encompasses state leaders’
relative bargaining power, discount rates, and transaction costs. Relative bargaining
power is in part a function of the first three structural constraints. That is, economic
2
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structure, international dynamics, and government form influence the position of
state leaders vis-à-vis other influential actors and constituents. Nonetheless, Levi
(18-20) describes how state leaders can enhance their relative bargaining power by
accumulating coercive resources (through law, police, and courts), economic
resources (through ownership and control of the means of production), and political
resources (through maintaining discipline in their ranks and immobilizing
opposition). Levi’s (23) transaction costs “are the positive costs of bargaining a
policy and of implementing a policy once it has been bargained.” With respect to
revenue maximization, transaction costs are especially significant and take the
forms of “measuring revenue sources, monitoring compliance, using agents and
other middlemen, punishing the noncompliant, and creating quasi-voluntary
compliance” (23).
Levi’s concept of quasi-voluntary compliance is particularly illuminating.
A mechanism for lowering transaction costs, Levi distinguishes quasi-voluntary
compliance from costlier mechanisms for maximizing revenue to the state, such as
coercion (with high monitoring and enforcement costs) and normative congruence
(which depends on the state’s ability to capitalize on constituents’ extra-rational
motives such as ideology). Quasi-voluntary compliance is “voluntary because
taxpayers choose to pay” and is “quasi-voluntary because the noncompliant are
subject to coercion—if they are caught” (52). Quasi-voluntary compliance rests on
taxpayers’ expectations that “rulers will keep their bargains” and “the other
constituents will keep theirs” (53). In other words, as rational actors, taxpayers
expect material benefits from the state in return for paying taxes. Material benefits
may be public (such as peace, safety, and security; economic stability and
development; and natural resource management), private (such as patronage or sale
of office), or some combination thereof. Taxpayers also expect fairness: that their
compatriots will pay their fair share and those who do not will be forced to pay or
be punished.
State leaders may reinforce taxpayers’ expectations of material benefit
through what Levi (61) calls “precommitment” and “conditional cooperation.”
Precommitment may take the form of leaders publicizing binding budgets,
investing in public goods up-front, and in democratic regimes, subjecting
themselves to regular electoral contests. Conditional cooperation holds leaders
accountable to each other and finds a natural home in regular, public legislative
deliberation. State leaders may also reinforce taxpayers’ confidence in their
compatriots through “selective incentives,” “conditional cooperation,” and
“coordination and loyalty” (64-67). Selective incentives include tax breaks,
subsidies, or protections for key taxpayers who may otherwise avoid taxation. As a
form of conditional cooperation, the state may devolve monitoring and enforcement
functions to lower administrative units or even nonstate actors. Finally, the state
may coordinate taxpayers and encourage loyalty by informing its constituents about
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high compliance rates, publicly punishing noncompliance, and promoting the
goods and services it provides in exchange for tax compliance.
It is worth noting two nuances of quasi-voluntary compliance: the use of
focusing events and its relationship to legitimacy cultivation. First, the provision of
benefits associated with state leaders “keeping their bargains” need not be
considered a pure constraint on rulers. Levi (57) observes that rulers throughout
history have capitalized on—or even manufactured—focusing events such as war,
economic crisis, and natural disaster to shape the benefits the state provides to their
own preferences (perhaps at odds with those of the taxpayers). Second, Levi (68)
sees quasi-voluntary compliance as a way of conceptualizing legitimacy, defined
as “generalized consent to rules of conformity enforced by rulers on the polity.”
The significance of Levi’s conceptualization cannot be overstated, because as Levi
demonstrates, rulers may cultivate legitimacy through the mechanisms used to
manufacture quasi-voluntary compliance.

The Theory of Co-Predation
The theory I submit is built in part on Guiradon’s and Lahav’s contributions to our
understanding of the state and globalization. Guiradon’s and Lahav’s framework of
international constraints and state devolutionary response is useful in that
cryptocurrency poses challenges to the state for which it is not equipped to confront
alone. With respect to cryptocurrency, however, Guiradon’s and Lahav’s analysis
underappreciates the extent to which pressures such as digitization fundamentally
threaten states’ “capabilities to rule.” To address this shortcoming, I reformulate
Levi’s theory of predatory rule to accommodate the sweeping change digitization
has wrought since Of Rule and Revenue was penned. The theory of “co-predation”
extends Levi’s framework to accommodate cryptocurrency’s effects on information
flows and inherently transnational nature. It may also shed light on how states
manage the economic and political implications of digitization more broadly.
“Co-Predatory Rule” explains when states cooperate to maximize revenues,
as globalization and digitization threaten the effectiveness of traditional taxation
mechanisms. In this analysis, cryptocurrency alters the structural and behavioral
constraints of Levi’s theory of predatory rule such that international regimes—
collections of international laws, norms, and organizations specific to a particular
set of international affairs—become necessary to generate quasi-voluntary
compliance. States can no longer “go it alone” with respect to maximizing revenue,
at least if they choose not to rely on coercion or ideology. They must conscript other
states as co-predators to uphold monitoring and enforcement mechanisms involved
in quasi-voluntary compliance.
Three characteristics of cryptocurrency complicate the state’s ability to
maximize revenue: globality, pseudonymity, and ideology. Cryptocurrency’s
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globality and pseudonymity are problematic for taxation because they inhibit
information flow to the state, complicating measurement, monitoring, and
enforcement. Ideologies associated with cryptocurrency, such as “cryptoanarchism,”3 are problematic for quasi-voluntary compliance because they
represent wholesale dissent on the part of constituents.
Cryptocurrencies are global by design. Anyone with Internet access may
use cryptocurrency to transact with any other user across the globe. As anyone who
has sent money from one country to another can attest, cross-border payments are
not typically seamless and usually bear substantial transaction costs.
Cryptocurrencies are able to skirt barriers and lower transaction costs by operating
“peer-to-peer,” that is, without involving third-party financial intermediaries. A
significant corollary is that, because users can pseudonymously transact with
cryptocurrency, they can use it to subvert national capital controls and thwart
financial sanctions. Cryptocurrency is thus a striking example of digitization—
converting analog information into digital information so computers can process
and transmit it—employing modern cryptography to enable its covert use.
Consequently, the theory of co-predation addresses cryptocurrency’s
globality and digitality in understanding states’ constraints with respect to taxation.
The fact that cryptocurrency users a) may be earning income in another jurisdiction
and b) may not be known to the state constitutes a form of information failure which
complicates the state’s ability to tax such users. Following Levi’s model, the state
may resort to coercion, ideological manipulation, or quasi-voluntary compliance.
Coercion is relatively straightforward but bears significant monitoring and
enforcement costs because it effectively relies on outlawing cryptocurrency. Such
heavy-handedness also potentially diminishes the state’s legitimacy in the eyes of
those attracted specifically to cryptocurrency and technology or more generally,
liberal human rights norms. Ideological manipulation shares similar risks to those
of coercion, but targets a relatively small proportion of taxpayers who are extrarationally motivated. That is, such users would be expected to pay taxes, not out of
self-interest, but out of some normative kinship with the state and its aims.4 For a
state to create quasi-voluntary compliance with respect to cryptocurrency taxation,
it must delegate a significant share of its monitoring and enforcement activities to
nonstate actors and other states. In the cryptocurrency environment, nonstate actors
such as cryptocurrency “wallet” services and exchanges (akin to banks and
investment brokerages) are able to collect user identities to peel back the veil of
anonymity. In turn, states may collect users’ financial information from
cryptocurrency services and exchanges, and transmit relevant tax information to
3

See Annex: Crypto-Anarchism.
Further complicating the state’s incentives to manipulate ideology with respect to cryptocurrency
is attracting attention to the ideological basis of cryptocurrency itself, which is wholly at odds with
the modern nation-state. See Annex: Crypto-Anarchism.
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their counterparts. This analysis applies the theory to examine such construction of
quasi-voluntary compliance through states’ commitment to the Standard for
Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters (or
“Automatic Exchange of Information,” AEOI).

Alternative Explanations of Co-Predation
Before applying the theory, it is worth exploring several alternative explanations of
the impact of digitization on the state. The first takes ontological issue with the
dynamic of co-predation, conceiving international regimes as mere epiphenomena
of the state. In this line of reasoning, any form of co-predation does not mean that
global or digital pressures are outmoding the state; on the contrary, the ability of
the state to adapt by enjoining reciprocal relationships with other states is a
testament to the state’s persistent ability to pursue its own interest through multiple
means. To the extent that we observe international regimes appear to evolve on
their own, particularly when doing so may be at odds with state interests, this
argument falls short.
A second argument depends on cryptocurrency’s future. For some,
cryptocurrency is a mere fad, momentarily drawing attention due to speculative
frenzy: it is prone to collapse and certainly does not threaten the state. To be sure,
the technology is young, and its staying power remains to be shown, but states have
begun to take note. Bitcoin is perhaps the most widely recognized cryptocurrency
and offers a glimpse of the magnitude of cryptocurrency on world markets. While
Bitcoin has captured the popular imagination and reaches a market capitalization
of approximately $180 billion, there are over 5,000 other cryptocurrencies traded
today.5
Finally, there is a compelling argument that the AEOI is an imprecise
analytical measure. Cryptocurrency taxation is a targeted activity, whereas the
AEOI applies broadly to financial instruments. Indeed, the bulk of tax information
transmitted through AEOI is likely unrelated to cryptocurrency activities. Using the
AEOI in this respect is a blunt instrument, but until we have better measures of
cryptocurrency activities, it may help move analysis further along. For the time
being, applying the theory of co-predation to cryptocurrencies and the AEOI
provides insight into conditions that compel states to cooperate and into specific
reasons why states may be enjoined to take cryptocurrency seriously.

“Top 100 Cryptocurrencies by Market Capitalization,” CoinMarketCap, April 26, 2020,
https://coinmarketcap.com/. By comparison, if Bitcoin traded as a publicly listed corporation, it
would be the 55th largest in the world by market capitalization, on par with Paypal. However,
Bitcoin prices are highly volatile, often rising or falling by double digit percentages in a single day.
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Crypto-Friendly States and Automatic Exchange of Information
In 2013, the G20 requested that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) develop and implement a global standard for combating tax
evasion through information sharing. The OECD followed suit by designing the
AEOI and began implementing it in 2017. Xavier Oberson (2012, 7) describes the
AEOI as an international framework of reciprocal intergovernmental agreements to
systematically and regularly collect and transmit “taxpayer information by the
source country to the residence country concerning various categories of income.”
In effect, the AEOI distributes the burden of monitoring and enforcements among
participating countries, through OECD coordination. As of February 2020, of the
170 United Nations member states wherein cryptocurrency is legal,6 79 have
committed to the AEOI and 91 have not (see Table 1).

Global Legal Research Center, “Regulation of Cryptocurrency Around the World,” The Law
Library of Congress, June 2018, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/world-survey.php.
6
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Table 1. AEOI Commitment of Countries where Cryptocurrency is Legal
AEOI
(Yes)

Albania
Dominica
Maldives
Samoa
Andorra
Ecuador
Malta
San Marino
Antigua and
Estonia
Marshall Islands
Seychelles
Barbuda
Finland
Mauritius
Singapore
Argentina
France
Mexico
Slovakia
Australia
Germany
Monaco
Slovenia
Austria
Ghana
Nauru
South Africa
Azerbaijan
Greece
Netherlands
South Korea
Bahamas
Grenada
New Zealand
Spain
Barbados
Hungary
Nigeria
Sweden
Belgium
Iceland
Norway
Switzerland
Belize
India
Panama
Trinidad and
Brazil
Ireland
Peru
Tobago
Brunei Darussalam Israel
Poland
Turkey
Bulgaria
Italy
Portugal
United Kingdom
Canada
Japan
Romania
United States of
Chile
Kazakhstan
Russian Federation
America*
Costa Rica
Latvia
Saint Kitts and
Uruguay
Croatia
Lebanon
Nevis
Vanuatu
Cyprus
Liechtenstein
Saint Lucia
Czech Republic
Luxembourg
Saint Vincent and
Denmark
Malaysia
the Grenadines
AEOI Afghanistan
El Salvador
Liberia
Sierra Leone
(No)
Angola
Equatorial Guinea
Libya
Solomon Islands
Armenia
Eritrea
Madagascar
Somalia
Belarus
Eswatini
Malawi
South Sudan
Benin
Ethiopia
Mali
Sri Lanka
Bhutan
Federated States of Mauritania
Sudan
Bosnia and
Micronesia
Moldova
Suriname
Herzegovina
Fiji
Mongolia
Syria
Botswana
Gabon
Montenegro
Tajikistan
Burkina Faso
Gambia
Myanmar
Tanzania
Burundi
Georgia
Namibia
Timor-Leste
Cape Verde
Guatemala
Nicaragua
Togo
Cambodia
Guinea
Niger
Tonga
Cameroon
Guinea-Bissau
North Korea
Tunisia
Central African
Guyana
North Macedonia
Turkmenistan
Republic
Haiti
Palau
Tuvalu
Chad
Honduras
Papua New Guinea Uganda
Comoros
Ivory Coast
Paraguay
Ukraine
Congo
Jamaica
Philippines
Thailand
Cuba
Jordan
Rwanda
Ukraine
Democratic
Kenya
São Tomé and
Uzbekistan
Republic of the
Kiribati
Príncipe
Yemen
Congo
Kyrgyzstan
Senegal
Zambia
Djibouti
Laos
Serbia
Zimbabwe
* The United States has not formally committed to the AEOI but participates in practice through its
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act and set of related intergovernmental agreements.
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The table discloses little similarity within the two groupings: levels of
economic development, government form, membership in international
organizations, and demographics vary widely. Perhaps the most common
characteristic in one group but not the other is the degree of financialization, as one
may expect given the nature of the AEOI. Many countries that have committed to
the AEOI are also home to major financial centers, unlike most of those who have
not. Still, according to this logic countries such as Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, or Croatia
are unlikely commitments.
Recall the central claim of this article, that globalization and digitization
force the state to rely on international regimes. In the case of cryptocurrency
taxation, we would expect to see otherwise similar states make different
commitments with respect to the AEOI, given differing cryptocurrency tax policy.
Specifically, a state pursuing effective cryptocurrency taxation is more likely to
commit to the AEOI than a state that does not pursue effective cryptocurrency
taxation. To test this hypothesis, the rest of this analysis focuses on one pair of like
countries: Russia and Belarus. While Russia and Belarus differ substantially in
global influence (population, GDP, and geopolitics), their domestic political,
economic, and social conditions are far more similar than they are different.
Freedom House identifies both regimes as authoritarian, with low aggregate
freedom scores (Russia at 20, Belarus at 19).7 As of 2018, GDP per capita (at
Purchasing Power Parity) is $24,791 in Russia and $17,742 in Belarus.8 Roughly
equal shares of each country’s labor force work in agriculture (9-10%), industry
(23-28%), and services (63-67%). Approximately 76.4% of the Russian population
and 71.1% of the Belarusian population use the Internet.9 In effect, the countries’
similarities allow us to hold four of Levi’s six constraints constant while examining
the effects of international context and transaction costs on the differing policy
outcomes. Thus, the analysis assumes two of the structural constraints (productive
forces/economic structure and form of government) and two of the behavioral
constraints (relative bargaining power and discount rates) remain constant.

“Freedom in the World 2020: Countries and Territories,” Freedom House, 2020,
https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores.
8
“GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $),” World Bank,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD (accessed February 7, 2020).
9
“Country Comparisons: Russia vs. Belarus,” Index Mundi,
https://www.indexmundi.com/factbook/compare/russia.belarus (accessed February 7, 2020).
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Russia and the Kremlin Cryptocracy
Russian state behavior in the international context cannot be isolated from
its past. A once powerful, regionally competitive empire and subsequently more
powerful global superpower, the intimidating shadow of Russia’s past looms large
over its tumultuous present. Moscow’s influence on the world stage is now
overshadowed by its Cold War victors to the west and a rising China to the east.
Once supplying Warsaw Pact partners with a variety of commercial and industrial
goods, it now relies primarily on oil and gas exports for trade revenue.
Contemporary stories of Russian election interference, state-supported spyware,
and cyberwarfare employed in Georgia and Ukraine suggest that Russia has
unabashedly turned to technology to exert international influence.10
With respect to cryptocurrency, the Russian state is moving tentatively,
having recently legalized cryptocurrency and wading into designs for its own statebacked “cryptoruble.”11 As declining oil revenues and sanctions take their toll on
the ruble, cryptocurrency is attracting interest from leaders and citizens alike. That
said, Russia’s cryptocurrency industry is nascent compared with international
frontrunners such as China and the United States. If Russians choose to trade in
cryptocurrency, they are likely to look overseas, which is where the AEOI comes
in. The state levies a 13% tax on personal cryptocurrency incomes and 24% on
corporate cryptocurrency activities. Short of banning international networking or
forcing personal financial disclosures of cryptocurrency holdings—which would
carry substantial transaction costs—the Russian government has agreed to
international information exchange. In terms of this analysis, Russia has become a
co-predatory state.
Belarus and Landlocked Offshoring
With its reputation for a heavy hand in industrial affairs, relative isolation,
and stalled economy, landlocked Belarus has emerged on the international scene as
an unlikely cryptocurrency haven. Geographic and economic factors have drawn a
disproportionately substantial number of cryptocurrency mining operations to the
country.12 Its low temperatures year-round enable miners to pack many rigs into
Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler, “Russia’s Approach to Cyber Warfare,” CNA Analysis &
Solutions Occasional Papers, March 2017, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DOP-2016-U014231-1Rev.pdf.
11
Max Seddon, “Putin Considers ‘Cryptorouble’ as Moscow Seeks to Evade Sanctions,” Financial
Times, January 1, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/54d026d8-e4cc-11e7-97e2-916d4fbac0da.
12
Cryptocurrency mining is a critical network process, using computing power voluntarily
contributed by users (“miners”) to validate transactions and secure the cryptocurrency network. The
prospect of winning mining rewards in the form of newly minted cryptocurrency and transaction
fees incentivize miners to devote computing power.
10
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low-rent warehouses without needing to pay as much to keep their mining rigs cool
as in higher temperature countries. In response to foreign investment in the local
cryptocurrency economy, and likely to attract further investment, the Belarusian
state has embraced the technology.
In December 2017, Belarus announced a set of comprehensive measures to
liberalize its economy with respect to cryptocurrency, calling the framework “the
first of its kind in global scale.”13 Key features of the framework include the
creation of an economic development zone dedicated to the technology,
unregulated cryptocurrency fundraising, and a legal framework supporting the
technology’s use and expansion. As part of this legal framework, Belarusian
President Alexander Lukashenko decreed cryptocurrency incomes tax-exempt
through 2023.14 Consequently, because Belarus does not collect taxes on
cryptocurrency, it has little incentive to commit to the AEOI, at least with respect
to cryptocurrency. It is perhaps unsurprising then, to find that Belarus has not
committed to the AEOI. If anything, by doing so, Belarus would face higher
transaction costs given the attendant obligation to monitor and report domestic
cryptocurrency activities by residents of other countries.

Conclusion
To reiterate, the theory of co-predation predicts that a state pursuing
effective cryptocurrency taxation forces it to cooperate with other states and
nonstate actors. While Russia presents a relatively straightforward case of copredation, Belarus appears less concerned with raising tax revenues from
cryptocurrencies than fostering the development of cryptocurrency. In either case,
the implications for state sovereignty in a digital, global era are evident. To fight
tax evasion, Russia has chosen to delegate a portion of monitoring and enforcement
activities outside its scope of authority. It depends on foreign cryptocurrency
services and exchanges to report holdings of its domestic users, via co-predatory
states that are party to the AEOI. By contrast, Belarus has no need to delegate such
authority, having chosen to liberalize an innovative sector of its economy. Unlike
Russia, it is not engaging in co-predation with respect to cryptocurrency and AEOI.
One objection to this conclusion is that it is premature, because the AEOI is
relatively new. That may be the case, but as of yet, there is little indication of its
Artem Tolkachev and Denis Aleinikov, “Belarus Enacts Unique Legal Framework for Crypto
Economy Stakeholders,” Deloitte Legal, December 27, 2017,
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ru/Documents/tax/lt-in-focus/english/2017/2712-en.pdf.
14
Tatsiana Kulakevich, “Why Would Authoritarian Belarus Liberalize Cryptocurrencies?” The
Monkey Cage, January 25, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2018/01/25/why-would-authoritarian-belarus-liberalize-cryptocurrencies.
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intent to commit to AEOI. Furthermore, Belarus has been party to bilateral
automated information exchange with the United States since 2015. Among
countries where cryptocurrency is legal, those with such intergovernmental
agreements with the United States are far more likely to be parties to the AEOI than
not (60 out of 77). This observation suggests that Belarus is indeed contradicting a
norm, implying it must have a compelling reason to do so.
It is also important to consider the connection Levi makes between quasivoluntary compliance and legitimacy. Both Russia and Belarus are authoritarian
regimes and thus suffer from reduced legitimacy due to increased reliance on
coercion. The Russian case may reflect an attempt to boost much-needed legitimacy
by sharing taxation duties internationally while allowing its citizens to partake in
the cryptocurrency economy. Where no tax revenues are (currently) at stake,
Belarus has no need to create quasi-voluntary compliance. Rather, it appears to be
fostering legitimacy through the symbolic construction of a state embracing
technological innovation. Since all states seek legitimacy (as well as revenues),
further analysis into the dynamics at play in democratic regimes of the digital age
is merited.
While this analysis focuses on co-predatory rule as a method of maximizing
revenue, the interplay between cryptocurrency and states suggests an additional
advantage of co-predation. If states become more concerned by cryptocurrency, tax
policy may become instrumental. Cryptocurrency’s long-term viability depends on
substantial network growth. That is, the value of cryptocurrency to its users depends
in large part on how many others use it. Like “sin taxes,” which may be designed
to reduce certain behaviors such as alcohol and tobacco consumption, an effectively
high tax on cryptocurrency may stunt its growth by discouraging its use. Otherwise,
the state may lose more than just its predatory monopoly.
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Annex: Crypto-Anarchism
No discussion of cryptocurrency and the state is complete without an introduction
to “crypto-anarchism.” In 1992, three computer programmers in San Francisco
started an online mailing list to discuss their shared interest in cryptography. The
list grew, as hundreds joined over the next couple years and discussions ranged
beyond technical aspects of cryptography to politics, philosophy, and everything in
between. The community quickly became known as “cypherpunks.” Steven Levy
writes, “In the Cypherpunk mind, cryptography is too important to leave to
governments or even well-meaning companies.”15 Many of the cypherpunks’
shared interests coalesced around a unique political identity: self-described
libertarian-leaning “crypto-anarchists.” Timothy C. May, one of the original three
programmers, described crypto-anarchy in an early email to the list and forecast,
“Just as the technology of printing altered and reduced the power of medieval guilds
and the social power structure, so too will cryptologic methods fundamentally alter
the nature of corporations and of government interference in economic
transactions.”16 May and his contemporaries set the stage for a technological
revolution that would pit likeminded developers against government agencies like
the National Security Agency and powerful corporations like Equifax. Their goal
would be digital emancipation and their weapon would be cryptography,
cryptocurrency being one of their earliest pursuits. Many cryptocurrency
proponents also claim that by eliminating a central monetary authority,
cryptocurrency avoids human fallibility and political pressures to manipulate the
money supply. For both ideological and technical reasons, cryptocurrency is not
just a financial tool but can also be a distinct form of political dissent.
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